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1. Introduction
In the last years a number of  experimental and theoretical studies have been published which relate quantum mechanics (QM) to biological systems (Ve-
dral 2011), (Romero-Isart et al. 2010), (Collini et al. 2010), (Gerlich et al. 2011), 
(Panichayangangkoon et al. 2010), (Abbot et al. 2008), (Lloyd 2011), (Ball 2011), 
(Lambert et al. 2013). The importance of  this is not the occurrence of  quan-
tum effects in biology – that’s nothing new – but the fact that these play a non-
trivial role (Davies 2004) as they occur at an unexpected size- and temperature 
scale. When dealing with QM it seems that one enters a new world, the quan-
tum world, where new concepts are often in conflict with prejudices based on 
a mechanistic world view of  classical physics. For some this new world seems 
to be strange and exotic, full of, what is called, quantum weirdness. But per-
haps part of  the strange impressions could be avoided if  we would draw more 
attention to the intellectual tools we are using for our analysis. In the discus-
sion about the fundamental issues of  QM inevitably one uses concepts like 
causality, (un-) determinism, movement, change, reality, space and time : all 
of  these also being studied in philosophy. The foundation of  QM belongs not 
only to the field of  science in the sense of  natural science. Also philosophy, 
part of  the Geisteswissenschaften (humanities) enters this field as it delivers and 
develops the concepts and tools needed for a fundamental analysis.
There is a big issue with philosophy as, from the outside, one observes a 
group of  people who in nearly 3000 years of  history came up with quite differ-
ent, and sometimes contradictory approaches to explain the ultimate causes 
of  the universe and the beings therein. In spite of  this discouraging diversity 
one can distinguish a classical line of  thinking originating from the Greek 
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philosopher Aristotle, further elaborated by Thomas Aquinas and others and 
continued nowadays as an active field of  study at numerous academic insti-
tutions. In the following, often reference is made to this specific Aristotelian-
Thomistic (A-T) approach, thereby inspired by P. Hoenen, who in his phil-
osophical analysis of  modern science (Hoenen 1947) applied in an original 
way classical concepts. This choice for a philosophy inspired by Aristotle is 
not arbitrary, because Aristotelian logic, for example, is still at the basis of  
mathematical logic and mainstream scientific argumentation. Also his analy-
sis of  causality and his concept of  First Cause is still extensively used, see, for 
example, Stephen Hawkings’s A brief  history of  time (Hawking 1988), (Dries-
sen 1995). Heisenberg, one of  the founding fathers of  QM, extensively used 
Aristotelian metaphysics in his explanation of  the fundamentals of  this new 
theory (Heisenberg 2007). Soler Gil (2003) demonstrates that the Aristotelian 
ontology can be successfully applied to objects of  QM.
Turning now our attention to living matter, again a new world seems to 
open, so familiar to us human beings, but also so strange or weird as the 
quantum world. It is often called the mystery of  life. Up to now no biologi-
cal material or even less a complete cell could be synthesized starting from 
pure chemical substances. There is a mystery about life in all its forms from 
the most primitive forms, a virus, a bacteria up to higher levels in flora and 
fauna. When speaking above about the quantum world it became obvious 
that scientific terms are also studied or even had their origin in philosophy. 
The same holds for the answer to the question, “What is life ?”. Philosophers 
from the very beginning of  ancient Greek history, have developed profound 
ideas about life, see, e.g., Weber (2011).
For many scientists the ability to understand life and to reproduce biologi-
cal processes is a matter of  time and years of  intensive research. In order to 
achieve this understanding one should unravel the chemical processes and 
study the underlying physical phenomena in detail. According to this view, bi-
ology will eventually become applied chemistry and chemistry applied phys-
ics. Others prefer a holistic view instead and consider living matter as some-
thing that cannot be reduced to an agglomerate of  lifeless building blocks. 
In engineering a similar situation can be observed. Some concentrate on the 
components and others prefer a system approach. A unique classification, 
however, in terms of  system or components is not possible, as a multi-level 
hierarchical structure can be found. This is a general property of  complex sys-
tems where no natural detail level can be assigned for an adequate description, 
see, e.g. Mitchell (2009). To give an engineering example, the components of  
a simple telecommunication system are on their own subsystems, namely a 
transmitter, receiver and a transmission line. Again, a large number of  these 
telecommunication systems can be integrated to form a communication net-
work or eventually the World Wide Web. Coming back to the highly complex 
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biological systems one may state that reductionism is not the one and only 
option, see (Brigandt and Love 2012).
In the present study two concepts will be central : information and unity. 
To begin with the last, unity is the central concept in living matter. This can 
be seen by considering the opposite, division or decomposition, which is the 
most clear manifestation of  death. In the 19th century mechanism, unity is 
reduced to a geometrical arrangement of  parts, like in a machine. QM has 
proven that that is not the correct approach, as entanglement and superposi-
tion play an essential role. And these new phenomena, which have no classical 
equivalent, are both closely related to the concept of  unity. Information is the 
other characteristic of  living matter as is illustrated, for example, in the title 
of  a paper on the origin of  life by the Nobel Laureate Manfred Eigen : Wie ent-
steht Information ? (How does information originate) (Eigen 1976). Information 
is related to the complexity of  a system. And living organisms are top-ranked 
in the ladder of  complexity, as they are far away from the boring periodicity 
of  minerals and the trivial chaos in an ideal gas (Arecchi 1993). Information 
connects also to the philosophy of  Aristotle, as the concept of  information 
is related to the reception or acquisition of  a form in the Aristotelian sense (Del Re 
1993).
It is a challenging endeavor to deal with three disciplines : biology, physics 
and philosophy in a single paper. We will follow the same method Aristotle 
applied in his work. In ancient Greece it was possible to acquire an adequate 
knowledge of  the science of  his time in a single lifetime. Aristotle acquired 
this knowledge and applied it to lay the foundations of  his philosophy and 
provide illustrative examples. Science since then has made an enormous prog-
ress, but the ultimate objective to integrate science and philosophy in a con-
sistent picture still remains. The everyday experience that was sufficient for 
the Greek philosophers is now increased by scientific evidence that is only un-
derstandable by the specialists. Close interaction therefore is needed between 
philosophers and scientists that eventually would lead to better understanding 
of  philosophy as well as science.
This work starts with an overview of  how life is treated in the classical A-T 
approach and gives also comments on a few alternatives. In the subsequent 
section the focus is on the relation between the whole and the constituent 
parts. It is the most challenging part as philosophical concepts and statements 
are evaluated in the light of  scientific experience. The latter mostly include ex-
amples from QM and also quantum biology. In the discussion some specula-
tive ideas are presented about life being a kind of  macroscopic entangled state 
(see Vedral 2011) enabling unexpected efficiency in attaining advantageous be-
havior. Finally a recommendation is given for an open dialogue between phi-
losophers and scientists with an added value for both.
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2. Life in philosophy
For common people an animal, for example a dog, is clearly distinguished 
from non-living objects. Classical philosophy as expressed by Aristotle follows 
this common-sense distinction and gives the following definition : by life we 
mean self-nutrition and growth with its correlative decay (Aristotle 350 BC).This 
definition is valid for the three stages of  life : plants, animals and human be-
ings. Aquinas adds in his commentary on Aristotle an additional aspect :
« Something is living not only because it has growth and decay, but also because it is 
able to feel and grasp intellectually and is able to carry out other works of  life…It is 
therefore a property of  life to move oneself, whereby movement has to be taken in 
the widest meaning » (Aquinas 1269).
It is obvious that Aquinas addition regarding feeling and intellectual activities 
within the material world is valid only for animals and human beings. In both 
definitions an important assumption is made : If  living objects perform their 
own activities, like self-nutrition or growths, it means that they are subjects 
clearly distinguished from the environment. And as subjects they possess a 
high level of  unity. The aspect of  unity is important and may be illustrated 
by the following, perhaps somewhat crude example. If  a stone is divided, one 
obtains two stones with a reduced size. If  a dog is divided one gets two pieces 
of  a cadaver or in the best case a stunted dog and some body parts.
In order to find a sufficient reason for the observed unity in living -and also 
lifeless objects- Aristotle and his followers developed the idea of  matter and 
form, or with Greek terms the hylomorphism. Life is supported by a principle 
of  life, the form (Greek morphe, Latin forma) which informs a certain matter 
(Greek hyle, Latin materia) such that it is a living organism. In the above given 
comparison between a dog and a stone one could say that information makes 
the difference, as the form is responsible for something being what it is. The 
form of  living objects Aristotle coined psyche (soul). It is important to note 
that the form is a metaphysical principle of  life, which means in general not an 
object of  reality existing on its own in- or outside the organism. With the hyl-
omorphism Aristotle was able to make a philosophical analysis of  change in 
terms of  a remaining principle, the matter and the exchanged one, the form.
It can happen that old concepts with strange names like hylomorphism 
seem to be outdated. Translated in modern language, however, one finds an 
unexpected actuality. The form, the principle of  life, can be considered as in-
formation implemented in a suitable matter, or in computer terms as soft-
ware implemented in a certain hardware. There is no standalone software. It 
has always to be implemented in a piece of  hardware. For example, a docu-
ment has to be on a cd, dvd, memory stick or any other hardware medium. 
On the other hand, hardware always has a certain form, a random bit pattern 
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or only 0’s or only 1’s. Only combinations of  hard- and software occur in the 
real world, and similarly real objects in our visible world consist of  informed 
matter and never just of  standalone matter or standalone forms.
Coming back to living organism one find in the definition above a second es-
sential aspect : living matter exhibits an activity on its own, unexpected when 
observing an environment that remains at rest. The dog, for example, that is 
jumping towards the children needs no moving parts in the garden where he 
was watching. In order to enable this activity there is something new in living 
matter. It appears as an organism, i.e. a structure containing parts with dif-
ferent functions, ‘organs’. To make this possible one needs in the first place 
a new level of  information. The form or information is not only the reason 
that the living being is as it is, but is also responsible for its characteristic func-
tional behavior and development in time. The latter includes among others 
growth and restorations after injuries as well as reproduction. In the philo-
sophical analysis based on the A-T approach with only pre-scientific experi-
ence one obtains the following fundamental results : There are three levels of  
life : plants, animals and human beings all with certain characteristics. In the 
higher levels the lower levels are present. When considering human beings, 
one finds processes (movements in philosophical terms), which are complete-
ly vegetative, for example division of  cells during growth. That does not mean 
that human beings have a set of  several forms : vegetative, animal and human. 
Instead, they have only one single form that includes all levels including the 
inorganic aspects.
One should also recall that being and form are concepts with a relative, not 
univocal meaning, they are analogous, transcendental terms, as they can be 
applied at several levels (Blanchette 2005). Considering a dog, for example, we 
see a single well-defined being. One can consider also a single hair of  this dog 
and one will find no difference between the hair still rooted in the skin or one 
just fallen on the ground. Even when the dog is dead the hairs will continue 
to grow during the first hours after its death. That means that a dog should 
be considered as a unity but when focusing on specific aspects one seems to 
deal only with an agglomeration of  parts. Applying the paradigm software 
and hardware for the traditional terms form and matter, one could say that 
the software, i.e. the information implemented in that dog, is built up of  hier-
archical building blocks. These building blocks are already used in the lower 
levels, like the information needed for cell division, and can be studied sepa-
rately by scientific means, like bio-chemistry, gen-technology etc. It is obvious 
that these particular sciences alone will never give a total view of  a dog due to 
their willingly restricted approach.
Before Aristotle another philosophical system tried to make change intel-
ligible. The Atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) reduced the variety of  be-
ings and their change to the geometrical arrangement of  identical parts, the 
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atoms. That view can explain the fact that in all things one finds the same 
building blocks, but fails completely to provide intelligibility to the strong 
unity in living beings. One could say that the Atomists propose a still rudi-
mentary version of  hylomorphism. What later with Aristotle would be meta-
physical principles, matter and form, are still considered as beings on its own 
and geometry. The atoms, the material in A-T terms, are already complete 
beings and the form is reduced to continuously varying geometrical arrange-
ments. The ideas of  the atomists were taken up in the 17th-19th centuries and 
are often implicitly assumed by reductionists. In their most radical view all 
beings, including animals and man, are nothing but agglomerations of  atoms 
with a certain arrangement.
In the seventeenth century Descartes considered living beings as complex 
machines. Regarding man he writes that the bodily movement is not more 
or less than the movements of  a watch or other automaton (Descartes 1632). 
This view, of  course, first appears quite shocking, but expresses an important 
observation. If  one analyses the human body, one will eventually find noth-
ing else than what can be found in the inorganic world. The laws of  physics 
are valid in engineering as well as in biological systems. This observation, of  
course, is not able to explain the full spectrum of  biological phenomena but 
excludes certain kinds of  vitalism (Bechtel and Richardson 1998) that claim the 
existence of  a non-localized substance responsible for biological functions.
Currently the main stream of  biologists assumes, at least implicitly, a light 
or strong version of  reductionism. Plants, animals and even human beings are 
nothing but an arrangement of  atoms or molecules in a certain order. When 
explaining the occurrence of  order they follow Darwin’s line of  reasoning 
regarding evolution. They state that the changes and the occurrence of  or-
der are exclusively based on randomness or chance and subsequent natural 
selection. Here a comment could be given on this statement, as it belongs to 
the fundamentals of  physics and, more precisely, QM that the occurrence of  
chance in a particular event cannot be detected by any scientific experiment 
(Driessen 2010). The conclusion, therefore, about randomness or alternatively 
any indication of  willful design cannot be drawn by a pure scientific analysis, 
but only by reflection on scientific results within the realm of  philosophy and 
metaphysics.
In summary one can say that most of  the views presented emphasize im-
portant aspects of  life. While doing so, however, other aspects become un-
derexposed or sometimes even completely unintelligible. The hylomorphism 
of  Aristotle, as an intermediate approach between vitalism and strict mate-
rialistic reductionism appears as a good starting point for further analysis of  
scientific experience.
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3. Need of a system approach in science
In the previous section the high degree of  unity in living objects in contrast to 
inorganic ones has been stressed. Unity means that one should first consider 
the whole or system and only thereafter the parts or components. The whole 
is more than just the sum of  the parts, a view shared largely in modern physics 
(Healey 2009). The question arises about the nature of  the whole. Are the fun-
damental laws governing the behavior of  the parts still valid when the parts 
are integrated in a system ? It seems proven experimentally that atoms or mol-
ecules from, let’s say a dog, react in exactly the same way as can be expected 
from standard chemistry. In that sense the reductionist approach is correct 
that living matter is governed by the same fundamental laws as lifeless matter. 
But how to take into account unity and order or, in philosophical terms, the 
form, i.e. the information implemented in living object ? In his landmark ar-
ticle, P.W. Anderson (1972), distinguishes between the road from the complex 
system to the parts (reductionism) and the other road from parts to the whole 
(constructionism). He writes :
« The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the 
ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe ».
He accepts the thesis of  the reductionist, but without necessarily excluding 
that the whole is subjected to natural laws that appear only at the higher level. 
In a few examples taken from his specialism, namely many body physics, he 
demonstrates that when increasing scale and complexity a shift from quantita-
tive to qualitative differentiation may occur. That means that the behavior of  
the system cannot be understood from an extrapolation of  the parts.
It is remarkable that most of  the examples of  Anderson involve QM. The 
question arises why this theory that started about a century ago, is so impor-
tant for our subject. In popular discussions on QM the statistical character 
of  the predictions is always mentioned and, relatedly, the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty relation. Also the particle-wave dualism with the resulting comple-
mentary descriptions is given special attention. Another equally important 
aspect, is less emphasized, namely that in QM there are changes that go be-
yond the geometrical rearrangement of  particles. In philosophy one speaks 
of  qualitative changes, if  not only quantitative aspects like size and geomet-
rical arrangement are involved but also quality, i.e. a transformation to a dif-
ferent kind of  thing (for a philosophical discussion of  qualitative properties 
in nature see Selvaggi (1996)). A qualitative change means that the system 
or the new thing is something completely different from the starting con-
stituent parts. The occurrence of  qualitative changes in QM is explained by 
Herwig Schopper, the former director of  CERN, in a lecture to a general 
audience. He describes the LEP experiment where electrons and positrons 
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where h is the Planck constant. Consider now that the particle is 
composed of two identical parts, for example a H2 molecule that is 
composed of two H atoms. Theory tells us that with identical υ one gets 
for the de Broglie wavelength: λH = 2 λH2. If the molecule would be the 
same as just two H atoms, the wavelength would be λH, only the intensity 
of the wave would be different. That means that in theory a hydrogen 
molecule is treated as a system, not as a compound of two parts.  
What about the experiment? It is known that wave properties, like the 
wavelength, can experimentally relatively easily be determined by an 
interference set-up. The Young double-slit arrangement is the most 
simple arrangement. Particles are emitted by a source at equal speed in 
front of the two slits and are detected at the screen behind the slits with a 
movable particle detector or a detector array. In a classical approach with 
a particle source one would expect after some time two spots at the 
screen: a blurred image of the two slits. QM reveals the wave properties 
by displaying a fringe pattern on the screen. In the above given example 
with hydrogen atoms or hydrogen molecules one gets a periodic local 
maximum for the molecules exactly at two sets of positions, one where 
the atom pattern has a maximum and, quite surprisingly, another where it 
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has a minimum. That means that half of the H2 molecules are detected at 
positions where the count-rate for H atoms would be zero. One therefore 
may conclude that in the H2 experiment no hydrogen atoms are involved. 
The double slit experiment distinguishes between the system (H2) and the 
constituent parts (H). Any purely geometrical arrangement of two H 
atoms would lead to the same pattern as the single atom. 
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Hore, 2009). The other is the capacity of  fruit flies (Drosophila) to smell by 
detecting the vibrational spectrum of  odorant molecules (Franco et al. 2011). 
The functional behavior in all these three cases provides evidence that QM is 
involved, for a detailed discussion see Lambert et al. (2013).
It is appropriate to cite once again Anderson :
« The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin dif-
ficulties of  scale and complexity. The behavior of  large and complex aggregates of  
elementary particles, as it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of  a simple 
extrapolation of  the properties of  a few particles. Instead, at each level of  complex-
ity entirely new properties appear. […] At each stage entirely new laws, concepts and 
generalizations are necessary ». (Anderson 1972).
What is the new what one can find in the higher level system ? Anderson men-
tions new laws and concepts ; the philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1936) 
speaks of  a structure of  modal aspects of  reality with new law-spheres. In 
the A-T tradition one would say that at the higher level a new formal cause is 
acting. And the formal cause is related to information. One could say that the 
new laws at a higher level, mentioned by Anderson, bring additional informa-
tion to the system. And this is exactly what is needed to enable the enhanced 
functional complexity.
A-T philosophy makes use of  an important subtlety when dealing with the 
reality of  objects. Besides being real or not real, they can also potentially or 
virtually be real. To give an example, the beautiful designed apartment in the 
imagination of  an architect is not real, but can perhaps already be seen on the 
computer screen in virtual reality. Only after many hours of  work of  skilled 
craftsmen it becomes a reality. Being real or being an object of  reality is a se-
rious classification, as it means among others that it is by definition a being 
without any internal contradiction. That is why experiments have always the 
last word when comparing with theories, models and computer simulations. 
The opposite way is not necessarily true, being without internal contradiction 
does not imply that the object in question does really exist.
With this introduction one can now examine the properties of  the constitu-
ent parts in a whole. Let’s start with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and 
apply it to the hydrogen atom, consisting of  a proton and an electron. It states 
that the product of  the uncertainty in position Δx times the uncertainty in 
momentum Δp has a minimum value
Dx Dp ≥ h/(4 p) (2)
where h is the Planck constant. It appears that the radial position of  the elec-
tron in the ground state has an uncertainty of  about half  the radius of  the 
electron orbit in the Bohr model -for details see standard textbooks on phys-
ics like Cutnell and Johnson (2007). We end up with the surprising result that 
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the electron is not localized in a fixed radial position, as assumed in the Bohr 
model. The laws of  QM provide only the probability to find the electron at a 
certain distance of  the proton.
The situation is even more complex. In the Bohr picture the electron should 
circle around the proton with a resulting magnetic moment. This indeed is ex-
perimentally confirmed for the excited state. But a circulating charge should 
emit radiation that would slow down immediately the speed of  the electron. But 
in contradiction to Maxwell’s equations this has never been observed (Bohr was 
aware of  this inconsistency). Obviously the electron inside the hydrogen atom 
does not behave as a common electron. We therefore have to conclude that it is 
not possible to observe theoretically or experimentally the detailed properties 
of  the electron inside the hydrogen atom. The philosopher could say it is only 
virtually or potentially present ; in that case the contradictory properties (in-
deed a rotating charge plus a magnetic moment, but no radiation damping) are 
no problem. What is real is the whole or the system, the hydrogen atom with 
a certain mass, charge distribution, magnetic moment, etc. With sufficiently 
strong causes it is possible to obtain a real electron from a hydrogen atom. But 
doing so, the atom will be destroyed, the system has been reduced to its parts.
Heisenberg explicitly connects the probabilistic character of  the electronic 
state with Aristotelian philosophy. He writes :
« One might perhaps call it an objective tendency or possibility, a “potentia” in the 
sense of  Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, I believe that the language actually used by 
physicists when they speak about atomic events produces in their minds similar no-
tions as the concept “potentia.” So the physicists have gradually become accustomed 
to considering the electronic orbits, etc., not as reality but rather as a kind of  “poten-
tia.” » (Heisenberg 2007, pp. 154-155).
More generally one can state that once the compound, the whole or the sys-
tem is established, the constituent parts are only virtually present. A com-
parison with mechanics could illustrate this. Consider the parts of  a classical 
clock. It would be astonishing that a gear, once assembled, would become a 
diffuse object, a kind of  sponge, and appears as soft as butter. After disassem-
bling, however, it would be again hardened steel in its original shape. QM al-
lows such a weird behavior, i.e. the system may have properties which could 
not been expected when considering the constituent parts on its own.
A system intensively studied after the appearance of  Anderson’s Science 
paper are entangled photons. These are generated, for example, by down 
conversion in a nonlinear optical crystal. In Bell-type experiments (Bell 1997) 
the polarization states of  the individual photons are measured and compared 
with theoretical predictions. Any theory assuming that the polarization states 
of  the individual photons before measurements are fixed but nevertheless un-
known, is in contradiction with experiments. With other words, considering 
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entangled photons as just a pair of  photons with properties single photons 
normally exhibit, will not work. It means that physical reality cannot be de-
scribed mathematically by a product of  wave functions each related to one of  
the parts. Instead certain combinations of  wave functions, each one excluding 
the other, have to be taken into account to allow an adequate description of  
the system, for details see (Healey 2009).
Using A-T terminology for the case of  entanglement one could say that two 
entangled photons are a system, where the parts – the individual photons – ex-
ist only virtually, but not actually. Only the measuring process, or collapse of  
the wave function, converts the whole in two actually existing parts, the two 
photons. In that case the superposition state is changed to the product of  the 
wave functions of  the individual parts. Heisenberg states in a similar context :
« The probability wave of  Bohr, Kramers, Slater […] was a quantitative version of  the 
old concept of  “potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something stand-
ing in the middle between the idea of  an event and the actual event, a strange kind 
of  physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality » (Heisenberg 
2007).
There are more examples where specific QM states indicate a system that 
cannot be explained alone by the properties of  its parts. In superconductivity 
two electrons (fermions) are coupled to form a Cooper pair, which as bosons 
obey a completely different quantum statistics in comparison with the of  the 
individual electrons. These bosons at sufficient low temperature may undergo 
eventually a Bose-Einstein condensation leading to a macroscopic quantum 
state, the superconducting state. Superfluidity of  helium is another example 
of  Bose-Einstein condensation already mentioned in Anderson’s article, for 
more details see (Amico et al. 2008).
It is not the place to discuss in detail these examples. But one point should 
be made : Even in relatively simple systems in lifeless matter, e.g. two electrons 
that form a pair, one observes unexpected QM behavior. For the pairs (and not 
the individual electrons) are responsible for a completely new phenomenon, 
superconductivity, that could not be predicted from the individual parts (the 
electrons). On the other hand, any analysis of  the system of  two electrons in 
terms of  the parts (the individual electrons) reveals only the expected behav-
ior as predicted by reductionism, i.e. the normal electrical conductivity.
4. Discussion and concluding remarks
In the preceding section it has been tried to show that QM allows a view on 
reality different of  the 19th century view of  classical physics. The most re-
markable is, in my opinion, the evidence that there are qualitative changes 
in nature. These changes occur where a new form or in other words, new 
information is implemented in the system. That means that the systems in 
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nature cannot be reduced to a more or less complex arrangement of  the con-
stituent parts. In A-T terms of  the four aspects of  causality one could say that 
the formal aspects have to be considered. Focusing on the materials aspects, 
in this case the properties of  the constitutive parts, is not sufficient. The main 
reason for this is that the constituent parts are only virtually present in the 
whole, as discussed above in the case of  the hydrogen atom. Any notion of  
a localized electron in the atom leads to a contradiction in theory as well as 
in experiment. The same happens in the double slit experiment with light, 
atoms or molecules. If  one tries to identify experimentally or theoretically 
through which of  the two slits the object has passed, the interference pattern 
disappears. That means that the system of  double slits would have been sub-
stantially changed.
Is this such a weird situation ? For the Greek philosophy of  Aristotle and 
most other people it has been and is also now evident that there are changes 
beyond the pure rearrangement of  parts. An example taken of  the field of  art 
may illustrate this more clearly. Contemplating the masterpieces of  painters 
and sculptors of  all times one recognizes in the faces of  portrayed persons not 
only details of  form, colors, eyes, mouth, skin and hair but also beauty, passion 
and a kind of  summary of  the personal history of  that person. In the origi-
nals, the faces of  living persons, an enormous information is stored far beyond 
that could be expected from geometrical arrangements of  biological tissues.
The arguments up to now are valid for both, living and lifeless matter. What 
can be said about the field of  biology, the science that deals with life in all its 
material appearances ? In the introduction and first section we spoke about 
the mystery of  life and the clear distinction that both classical philosophy 
and common people make between living and non-living objects. It would 
be worthwhile to assume that there is an ontological basis for this distinction. 
The distinction is not in the parts one obtains after disassembling the whole. 
These are in common with those obtained from disassembling lifeless mat-
ter. Instead one should look for a higher-level organization made possible by 
a qualitative change connected with increased information. The above men-
tioned experimental results on enhanced light-harvesting, improved aviation 
and smelling provide evidence for the correctness of  the system approach. 
These are specific subsystems studied in biology. If  one now consider living 
organism from virus to human beings, could it be that what we call life is a 
system organized in a kind of  macroscopic super-entanglement ? Vedral (2011) 
arrives at a similar assumption. He states :
« Other experiments scale up this basic idea, so that huge numbers of  atoms become 
entangled and enter states that classical physics would deem impossible. And if  solids 
can be entangled even when they are large and warm, it takes only a small leap of  
imagination to ask whether the same might be true of  a very special kind of  large, 
warm system : life ».
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In the light of  the preceding a few suggestions can be made for biologists 
and philosophers. In classical philosophy there is a well-known adage, agere 
sequitur esse, which can be considered as a variant of  the principle of  causality. 
Translated literally as action follows being it expresses the idea that if  something 
happens, then there should be an ontological basis, with other words, effects 
arise only from existing causes. This principle lies at the basis of  any scientific 
work. Bearing this in mind biologists should dare to use phantasy and trust 
more in the creativity of  nature. With the words of  Seth Lloyd one may state : 
biology has a knack for using what works (quoted in Ball, 2011). If  one observes 
enhanced efficiency in light harvesting of  certain biological nanostructures 
that goes beyond the capabilities of  the constituent parts, then there should 
be an ontological basis, i.e. a system responsible for this. The same can be said 
for other scientific results. If  birds can detect very small magnetic signals in 
order to orient themselves during flight or when fruit flies differentiate be-
tween molecules with different vibration levels but otherwise identical chemi-
cal properties then there should be a complex system responsible for this. In 
all three cases QM seems to be the only explanation as discussed above. The 
classical ball and spring models for molecules cannot account for the extraor-
dinary performance of  the system. Instead one has to use a system approach 
where the whole is qualitatively different from the aggregation of  the con-
stituent parts.
Immediately another question arises about an important point of  discus-
sion in evolution. If  one encounters evidence for evolutionary paths with es-
sentially zero probability (Meyer 2009), (Lloyd 2002) within the probabilistic 
resources of  the universe, should one then not look for systems which allow 
a much more efficient route to complexity than a blind trial and error ap-
proach ? In the light harvesting experiments one encounters enhanced effi-
ciency of  transport of  excitons towards the absorption centers due to quan-
tum interference. Ball explains it as follows :
« In fact, they (the coherent quantum waves) could simultaneously explore a multi-
tude of  possible options, and automatically select the most efficient path to the reac-
tion centre » (Ball, 2011).
Could it not be that the additional information available in higher level bio-
logical systems allows also a much more efficient route to mutations with im-
proved adaptations to the environment ? In both cases QM could be the means 
how nature provides additional information to the system so that steps to a 
profitable situation of  the system are less random or blind than one would 
expect from the statistical properties of  the parts. The origin of  additional 
information would be due to the natural laws governing the higher level sys-
tem. In a certain sense saying that at a certain step qualitative changes occur 
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is the same as saying that nature is providing new information. In this way a 
hierarchy of  complexity can be obtained in accordance with experience, see, 
e.g. (Mitchell, 2009), and the A-T view on increasingly higher level of  formal 
causality.
A recommendation could also be made to philosophers. In classical philoso-
phy the available experience at a given culture was used to establish the philo-
sophical system. Would it not be worthwhile to use the immense increase in 
knowledge to work on methods for performing a consistency check on the 
different philosophical systems ? For example, in a philosophical framework 
that ignores qualitative changes QM would be not intelligible. Also Kant ide-
alism has great problems, as is pointed out in a study on relativity and QM by 
Mittelstaedt (1975). But in order to do this, an open dialogue between scien-
tists and philosophers is needed as the scientific evidence is often written in a 
formal language incomprehensible to outsiders. On the other side one finds 
among scientists often only elementary knowledge of  philosophy and a cer-
tain unfamiliarity with abstract philosophical reasoning.
There is an additional point to be made. Philosophy has the ambition to 
reach truth and attain wisdom that means to provide answers to the deepest 
questions humans can ask. What mostly can be seen instead is a very high level 
of  erudition together with a certain reluctance to make choices and acknowl-
edge truth. In science a theory is abandoned when it is falsified by new in-
sights. It would be a matter of  wisdom to put less confidence on philosophical 
systems that do not surpass a consistency check not only with common sense 
knowledge but also with sophisticated scientific results obtained in science or 
mathematics (Driessen, 2005). Hawking makes a challenging statement about 
philosophy in his book The Grand Design (Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010) :
« Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy 
has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics ».
The reproach addressed to the philosophers is perhaps exaggerated but lack 
of  life, i.e. disintegration is surely observable. It is modesty or perhaps a pessi-
mistic view on the capacity of  the human ratio that leads to an auto-limitation 
to particular aspects of  knowledge instead of  offering a coherent philosophi-
cal reflection on reality. In order to include the results of  modern science in 
the philosophical reflection, more interaction between scientist and philoso-
phers is clearly needed. In that interdisciplinary effort, both philosophers and 
scientists could profit enormously ending up eventually with an satisfying an-
swer to the question, “What is life ?”.
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Abstract  : The rapidly increasing interest in the quantum properties of  living matter stimu-
lates a discussion of  the fundamental properties of  life as well as quantum mechanics. In 
this discussion often concepts are used that originate in philosophy and ask for a philosophi-
cal analysis. In the present work the classic philosophical tradition based on Aristotle and 
Aquinas is employed which surprisingly is able to shed light on important aspects. Especially 
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one could mention the high degree of  unity in living objects and the occurrence of  thorough 
qualitative changes. The latter are outside the scope of  classical physics where changes are re-
stricted to geometrical rearrangement of  microscopic particles. A challenging approach is used 
in the philosophical analysis as the empirical evidence is not taken from everyday life but from 
20th century science (quantum mechanics) and recent results in the field of  quantum biology. 
In the discussion it is argued that quantum entanglement is possibly related to the occurrence 
of  life. Finally it is recommended that scientists and philosophers should be open for dialogue 
that could enrich both. Scientists could redirect their investigation, as paradigm shifts like the 
one originating from philosophical evaluation of  quantum mechanics give new insight about 
the relation between the whole en the parts. Whereas philosophers could use scientific results 
as a consistency check for their philosophical framework for understanding reality.
Keywords : Aristotle, Aquinas, philosophy of  life, quantum biology, quantum mechanics.
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